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Additional advantages to this more functional procedure necessarily
follow. Since counsel no longer would have the opportunity to influence the
jury with their personality, much of the incentive for detailed inquiry would
be lost. Because each juryman would be subjected to only one examination,
and that a more limited one, a more rapid and less expensive impanelment
process would result. 0 Finally, the standardization and simplification of
impanelment procedure would tend to reduce the number of appeals. While
the court would still have some areas of discretion, there would be far fewer
technicalities to serve as the subject of dispute.
AMENDMENT OF VERDICT IN CRIMINAL CASES AFTER
THE JURY HAS BEEN DISCHARGED"'
IN order that a criminal defendant may have a fair trial the jury must be
impartial when impanelled and remain so until after it has announced its
verdict and is discharged. Accordingly courts have developed rules designed
to insure the selection of an unbiased body and to prevent outside influences
from prejudicing a jury during trial.' Moreover, any verdict rendered by a
jury which is shown to have had important prejudicial contacts is invalid,2
One stanchion in this framework of safeguards is the general rule that a
discharged jury cannot be recalled to amend or alter its work. 3 Since the
purpose behind this rule is to prevent amendment of the verdict in response
30. See Atkinson, The Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Kansas, 1 J.B.A. .
125, 134-5 (1932), and Potts, Desirability of the Fcdcral System for Sclcection of Jury 2-3,
IDAHO S.B. 58, 62 (1926).
The excessive amounts of time and money spent in permitting attorneys to e-amine
jurors have frequently been targets for the attacks of those advocating court-conducted
voir dires. Atkinson, supra, at 128; McCormick, Functions of Judge and Con:sel in the
Examination of Jurors, 22 J. Am. IxsT. Cins. L. & CRiAmN!oLerY 734, 735 (1932) ; Moore
The Voir Dire Examination of Jurors, II, 17 GEo. L.J. 13, 37 (1928). An extreme illustra-
tion of this delay and cost was the trial of a labor union slugger where the selection of the
jury took nine and a half weeks. Ten thousand veniremen were summoned, five thousand
talesmen were examined, and the cost to the state vas estimated in the vicinity of forty or
fifty thousand dollars. See WILLOUGHBY, PRanCIPLEs OF JUDICIAL ADmn;Imsruvroa i 510
(1929).
* Commonwealth v. Johnson, 359 Pa. 287, 59 A2d 128 (194S).
1. E.g., Peiffer v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. 468 (1851) (jurors not allowed to Eeparate
in capital case); Commonwealth v. Deutsch, 72 Pa. Super. 298 (1919) (jurors cannot read
newspapers which would prejudice them) ; State v. Perry, 121 N.C. 533 (197) (jury
visiting scene of crime made inquiry with regard to a material matter from a passerby).
See generally, 1 HYATT, TRIALS §§ 926-71 (1924).
2. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (reading newspapers). See HYATr,
TR.IJS §§ 922, 924 (1924).
3. Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 472 (1842); 1 HYATT, TRIALs §833 (1924).
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to outside pressure or prejudice, 4 its application seems appropriate only
where the jury might have been so influenced. Where merely formal altera-
tions are required and the jury's original intent is in all respects clear,
amendments should be allowed regardless of whether the jury has been
subjected to outside pressures. On the other hand, if the verdict cannot
support a judgment because it has failed to indicate a complete disposition
of the case, a jury which has separated should be allowed to amend only
where it could not in any way have been prejudiced in the interim. If they
can have been prejudiced and the verdict has such a defect, the result should
be a mistrial.'
A fortiori, amendment should never be allowed where a jury which has
rendered a verdict technically valid and clear on its face returns after it has
been discharged and exposed to possible prejudice to claim that it intended a
different result. Such" was the situation in Commonwealth v. Johnson.0 When
the court crier asked, "do you find Lee Ivory Johnson . . . charged with
murder, guilty or not guilty?" the jury foreman replied, "not guilty." The
jury was not polled, allegedly because the District Attorney was "shocked
into somnolence by the apparent miscarriage of justice." 7 But the court
crier read back the verdict as returned, and the judge expressed his surprise
at the outcome." Nevertheless, no juror protesting, the jury was then dis-
charged. It was not until after most of the jury had left the courtroom that
a few returned to protest that the verdict was incomplete and unintended.
The next day the jury was recalled, and it returned a unanimous verdict of
"not guilty of murder but guilty of voluntary manslaughter," and sentence
was imposed accordingly.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated this sentence on the ground
that the jury could not be reassembled after discharge to amend its verdictY
Looking to the policy of eliminating possible prejudice which lies behind
4. ". . . [I]n no case can [the court] be permitted to recall a jury, to alter, or
amend, their verdict, after it has been received, and the jury discharged. This would
jeopardize the jealous guards, with which the law has surrounded jurors, to insure the pure
administration of justice, and to protect the citizen ... no rule tending to insure the
.. purity of jurors, has, in the slightest degree, been abandoned or impaired." Sargent
v. State, 11 Ohio 472,474 (1842).
5. People v. Lee Yune Chong, 94 Cal. 379, 29 Pac. 776 (1892) (jury failed to state
degree of crime).
6. 359 Pa. 287, 59 A.2d 128 (1948).
7. Brief for Appellees, p. 9, Commonwealth v. Johnson, note 6 supra.
8. The trial judge stated that, in view of the strong case presented against the de-
fendant, he was satisfied "that the jury made a mistake." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 359
Pa. 287,289, 59 A.2d 128, 129 (1948).
9. The appellate court was also worried about the abuses to which recall after dis-
charge might lead. "If this practice were judicially sanctioned, a jury might acquit a
defendant of a crime and then a day, a week or a month later reassemble and declare that
the verdict was a mistake, that they intended to find the defendant guilty and would then
proceed to do so. . . . [Such a practice] is the antithesis of due process of law." hi.
at 294, 59 A.2d at 131.
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the rule against recall, this result seems appropriate: a jury which had dis-
persed and gone back to its work-a-day pursuits had returned to the court
room to substantially amend a verdict. The risk that the amended verdict
might have been affected by outside persuasion seems sufficiently great to
justify application of the rule despite the resulting acquittal of one whom
the jury had apparently intended to find guilty."'
But where amendment has served to correct a merely technical deficiency,
courts have generally found the rule against recall of a discharged jury to be
inapplicable." There is a sound rationale for permitting such amendments;
since the intent of the jury was clear before discharge, recall to correct errors
in form is in no way unfair to the defendant. -12 Thus amended verdicts have
10. However, after reversal in this case, it was still possible to try the defendant for
involuntary manslaughter. Defendant demurred to the evidence offered by the state on
the grounds that he could not be tried on an involuntary manslaughter charge when the
Commonwealth had already established in the first trial that the crime was voluntary
and intentional. The judge overruled the demurrer, and the defendant vas found guilty.
He was sentenced to two years in prison.
There have been other cases where refusal to permit amendment resulted in acquittal
or a less severe verdict. See, e.g., Allison v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 4, 156 S.WA2d 527
(1941) (jury recalled and amended verdict in accordance with its intention to recommend
that sentence be not suspended rather than that it be suspended; on appeal trial court
ordered to enter judgment on the original verdict) ; Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 472 (10-42)
(jury discharged after rendering verdict of guilty on first count of indictment but not
specifying as to second count; held error for court to enter judgment of guilty on second
count after reassembling jury and ascertaining that they so intended).
11. Cunningham v. State, 14 Ala. App. 1, 8, 69 So. 9,2, 935 (1915) (verdict corrected
to include place of punishment which is, however, fixed by law upon conviction); Layman
v. State, 126 Tex. Cr. R. 533, 534, 73 SAV.2d 97, 9S (1934) (jury failed to specify count
of the indictment on which they relied where only one count submitted to them in court's
charge).
Sometimes, but never in a capital case, the jury is permitted to deliver a sealed verdict
and separate until formal reopening of court. At that time they reconvene and give the
verdict orally in the presence of the defendant and are polled if either party so requests.
As the sealed verdict is not recorded, the jury can vary from it upon delivering the oral
verdict in court. HYATr, TMALS §§ 817, 827 (1924). Here, too, corrections as to form
are usually permitted. Steudle v. Territory, 19 Okla. 492, 91 Pac. 1024 (1907) (verdict
found all the defendants guilty except one who had been previously dismissed, but failed
to specify their names) ; Rhodes v. State, 6S Okla. Cr. R. 1, 49 P.d 226 (1935) (jury
mistakenly used word "money" in verdict instead of "property") ; but if the change af-
fects the substance of the verdict, a mistrial usually results. Commonwealth v. Lemley,
1538 Pa. Super. 125, 44 A.2d 317 (1945) (jurors changed their minds); see People v.
Duffeh, 163 Mich. 196, 205, 128 NAV. 245, 24S (1910) ; brit cf. Jaclzon v. State, 45 Ga. 193
(1872) (actions of defense counsel validated judge's recall of jury which had not found
as to the degree of manslaughter). And to send a jury out for further deliberations, if
the result vill affect the substance of the verdict, is reversible error. NVel% v. State,
116 Ga. 87, 42 S.E. 390 (1902); Petitti v. State, 2 0kl. Cr. R. 131, 100 Pac. 1122-
(1909).
12. See Cunningham v. State, 14 Ala. App. 1, 8, 69 So. 92, 935 (1915); Taggart
v. Commonwealth, 104 Ky. 301,305,46 SAV. 674, 675 (1S9).
19491
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
been permitted when the jury misspelled the name of the defendant 13 or
failed to specify the count of the indictment on which they relied where
only one count was submitted to them in the court's charge." Analogous
amendments are those necessary to correct defects in the manner of rendering
the verdict. Here, too, recall has been allowed to correct a deficiency caused
by delivery of the verdict when the defendant was not in court," or when
the jury has not been counted to ascertain if all were present.10
At times, however, courts have blindly applied the rule against recall and
invalidated verdicts regardless of whether the jury was, or could possibly,
have been prejudiced. Some courts set recordation of a verdict as an arbi-
trary time after which not even a formal amendment will be permitted."7
But recordation seems an unduly strict criterion for insuring that the jury
has not been open to prejudice, for the verdict is recorded by the clerk when
rendered orally and there may be a substantial lapse of time before the jury
separates.18
More often, courts have indicated, by allowing amendments where the
jury is still present 19 and disallowing them where it has left the presence of
the court,20 that presence is a rule of thumb test for determining a jury's
exposure to prejudice. But "presence," too, is an illogical criterion since the
mere fact that the jury has never left the courtroom does not insure that it
has not been subjected to prejudicial influences. For example, a hostile court-
room crowd may exert more than a modicum of pressure on a jury that has
failed to assuage its fancy. Or a judge with strong views on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant might be influential in causing a jury to realize
13. E.g., Commonwealth v. Breyessee, 160 Pa. 451, 28 Atl. 824 (1894).
14. E.q., Layman v. State, 126 Tex. Cr. R. 533, 73 S.W.2d 97 (1934).
15. Summers v. U.S., 11 F.2d 583 (1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 681 (1926)
Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 107 (1855).
16. Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211 (1857).
17. Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514 (1858). See Henner v. State, 104 Ark. 606, 615, 150
S.W. 146 (1912).
18. The only argument for permitting amendments as to form after recordation lies
in the abstract concept that a jury, once it has issued a verdict, ceases to exist and cannot
be revived. See Perryman v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 533, 278 S.W. 439, 440 (1925)
(". . . before the jurors were reassembled their identity as an organized body had ceased,
and the verdict [as amended] is but the act of a collection of individuals who had pre-
viously been members of the jury.").
19. Summers v. U.S., 11 F.2d 583 (1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 681 (1926) (jury still
an undispersed unit within the control of the court); Cunningham v. State, 14 Ala.
App. 1, 69 So. 982 (1915) (jury called back before leaving courtroom).
20. People v. Lee Yune Chong, 94 Cal. 379, 385, 29 Pac. 776, 778 (1892) ("A court
would, no doubt, have the power to direct a jury to correct an informal verdict, although
the mistake had not been discovered until after the verdict had been entered upon the
minutes, 'while the jury are before it and under its control.' "). See Melton v. Commoti-
wealth, 132 Va. 703, 712, 111 S.E. 291, 294 (1922) ("So long as the whole jury are in
the actual and visible presence of the court, and under its control, an inadvertent announce-
ment of discharge may be recalled . . . but not thereafter.")
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that it had "made a mistake." Furthermore, even though a jury has sepa-
rated and left the presence of the court, it is conceivable that the members
might be reassembled before any of them has been exposed to a prejudicial
influence. 21
In view of the danger of erroneous verdicts, plus the difficulty of their
correction, two preventive measures seem in order. Polling the jury should
be standard practice instead of depending on request by the parties..2 2 In
addition, the recorded verdict should be carefully reviewed by the court to
insure technical correctness before the jury separates. But erroneous ver-
dicts resulting from unintentional slip-ups will still occur on occasion, and
when they are discovered, the problem of amendment emerges. In these
situations, blanket application of the rule against recall seems far less de-
sirable than application of the policy behind the rule to each situation. No
reason is apparent for denying any correction as to form or even as to sub-
stance where it conclusively appears that the jury, although discharged, has
not been exposed to prejudice.
EDGAR L. SANFORD, JR.t
21. See, e.g. Mills v. Commonwealth, 7 Leigh. 751 (Va. 1836) (only one juror left
the courthouse and he went forty or fifty yards in the company of a deputy sheriff).
22. See HYArr, TRIALs §755 (1924).
It Member of the second-year class, Yale Law School.
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